After a brief hiatus (hey, it's August), the Supreme Court Preview is back! This time, I preview four cases that were granted this past April. Included are two fairly significant criminal procedure cases, an interesting case involving the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and one of the many bankruptcy cases the Court is taking up next term.
Here's this week's edition:
Georgia v. Randolph (
Georgia Supreme Court) [Topic: Fourth Amendment/Warrantless Searches]
Question Presented:
"Can police search a home when a co-habitant consents and the other co-habitant is present and does not consent?"
Background and Majority Opinion: [authored by Judge Robert Benham, appointed by a Democratic Governor]
Police entered the home of Scott Fitz Randolph after receiving, from Randolph's wife, consent to enter and search the home without a warrant. The catch? Scott was also present and did not consent to the warrantless search. Nevertheless, the police searched based upon his wife's consent and found Scott's cocaine. At his trial for drug possession, Randolph made a motion to suppress the cocaine evidence since he had not given the police consent (and there was no other reason here, other than consent, for the police to enter without a warrant). The trial court denied the motion, and Randolph appealed.
The Georgia appellate court reversed the trial court, and the Georgia Supreme Court subsequently affirmed. The court noted that this situation was different than in the US Supreme Court decision in United States v. Matlock, which held that police need only the consent of one person at the premises when the other person isn't there. Here, Scott Randolph was not absent - he actually was there and clearly did not consent. The police should have obtained his consent to conduct a warrantless search, and thus the cocaine evidence should have been suppressed.
Dissenting Opinion: [authored by Judge Carol Hunstein, appointed by a Democratic Governor (Zell Miller, actually)]
Judge Hunstein argued that the majority opinion ignored the "nearly uniform" interpretation of Matlock as allowing third-party consent even when a present co-inhabitant of the property refused consent (as happened here). The key principle to take from Matlock, according to Hunstein, is to look at whether a co-inhabitant assumed the risk that her fellow co-inhabitant would consent to a police search. Here, Randolph did assume that risk and the cocaine should be come in as evidence at trial.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
This case will clarify an interesting twist left open by the Matlock decision. Practically speaking, the actual rule set down by the Court will not have more than a small effect, since this somewhat odd situation does not appear to arise often. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning may be more important - if, as I expect, they embrace the "principles of Matlock" that Judge Hunstein noted in dissent. Such an "assuming the risk" analysis may have import in other areas of criminal law down the line, giving police more power to conduct warrantless searches. With that said, I expect the Georgia Supreme Court to be overturned here.
Maryland v. Blake (Maryland Court of Appeals) [Topic: Criminal Procedure/Miranda Rights]
Question Presented:
"When a police officer improperly communicates with a suspect after invocation of the suspect's right to counsel, does Edwards v. Arizona permit consideration of curative measures by the police, or other intervening circumstances, to conclude that a suspect later initiated communication with the police?"
Background and Majority Opinion: [authored by Judge Irma Raker, appointed by a Democratic Governor]
Edwards v. Arizona, a key 1981 Supreme Court criminal law case, held that police may not interrogate a suspect after the suspect exercises his Miranda rights and requests to talk to an attorney - unless the suspect later waives his prior request for attorney.
17-year old Leeander Jerome Blake was arrested for the alleged murder of another man in Maryland. The police drove Blake to the station, where they gave him his Miranda rights. Blake stated that he wouldn't talk without an attorney, and he was putting in a holding cell. A bit later, two officers went to Blake's cell and handed him a copy of the charges against him. The penalty listed on the statement of charges was in large capital letters reading "DEATH". However, Blake was not eligible for the death penalty under Maryland law because he was under 18, but this fact was nowhere on the statement of charges. After giving Blake the statement marked "DEATH", the officer said in a loud and confrontational voice: "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The other officer (within Blake's hearing) then reprimanded the first officer, stating that Blake had already asked for a lawyer and didn't want to talk.
According to the police, a short time later, when one of the officers approached Blake, Blake asked the officer "I can still talk to you?" The officer re-read Blake his Miranda rights, and this time Blake waived the right to an attorney. Blake, on the other hand, claimed that the officer first asked him if he wanted to talk before he agreed. Blake also claimed that while in the holding cell he was cold and wet (it had been raining outside), and that the "DEATH" statement scared him. Either way, Blake made some incriminating statements. At his subsequent murder trial, Blake sought to suppress these statements. The trial court held that the statement "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" was interrogation in violation of Miranda and Edwards.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland (MD's highest court) affirmed. The majority held that the officer's comment, coupled with the "DEATH" statement, was the functional equivalent of interrogation. The majority rejected the prosecution's argument that their conduct was well within the bounds of Edwards since Blake had waived his previous request for an attorney. The court also rejected (without much detail) the argument that the officers "cured" the constitutional violation when one officer reprimanded the other for questioning Blake.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
The question that the Court accepted is a little bit odd, at least to me. Basically, it concedes that the officer unconstitutionally interrogated the defendant, but asks whether later police actions can "cure" this constitutional violation. This strikes me as pretty significant, as the principles guiding a Court opinion reversing the Maryland court's decision has the potential to erode Miranda considerably. The whole point of Miranda and Edwards is to recognize that suspects often have little power vis-à-vis the police when they are being held, and to require that the police don't abuse this power to obtain questionable confessions. By allowing police "curative" measures of conceded constitutional violations, this principle takes a hit.
With that said, I think this may very well happen in a 5-4 decision reversing the Maryland court. Justice Kennedy may have drifted leftwards in his years on the court, but he is still quite conservative when it comes to criminal procedure issues. We'll see, but this case is definitely one to keep an eye on.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita (10th Cir.) [Topic: Religious Liberty/Statutory Construction]
Question Presented:
"Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 requires the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession, and use of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance, where Congress has found that the substance has a high potential for abuse, it is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and its importation and distribution would violate an international treaty."
Background and Majority Opinion: [per curiam decision]
O Centro Espirita is a Christian organization with beliefs stemming from South American traditions. In its religious ceremonies, this group uses a tea called hoasca, which also happens to be prohibited as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act. After the religious group's use of the drug caught federal attention, O Centro sought a preliminary injunction against the Attorney General's interference in their hoasca rituals. The organization claimed that such interference would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits the government from imposing a "substantial burden" on religious exercises without "a compelling government interest."
The Attorney General argued that the government does have a "compelling interest" here - to prevent harm to O Centro members, to prevent the tea from being used recreationally by others, and to comply with the US-entered United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The district court rejected this argument and granted the injunction, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The per curiam majority opinion held that O Centro must overcome a "heightened burden" to get the injunction, but found that the religious organization did meet this burden. The opinion held that the government failed to prove that hoasca poses a significant risk to O Centro members. It also held that the risk of recreational use is minimal, since only a small market exists for the tea, and that the Attorney General did not use the "least restrictive means" for complying with the UN Convention. The district court's grant of the preliminary injunction was thus affirmed.
Other Opinions:
There were a whole host of different opinions offered here. The decisions are long and fairly technical so I'll quickly summarize to get the basic arguments down.
One opinion disagreed with the injunction grant because the Attorney General's avoiding the US' violation of the UN Convention was itself a "compelling interest" to justify overcoming the RFRA. A second opinion would not have placed a "heightened burden" on O Centro to get the injunction. Still another opinion defended the totality of the per curiam opinion, arguing that it was correct in both placing a heightened burden and then granting the injunction. A final dissent from the majority opinion argued that O Centro was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its injunction claim (when, as is required, the propriety of the preliminary injunction is later considered in court).
Potential Impact/Prediction:
This is an interesting case, both legally and politically. Legally, this case tests the limits of the RFRA and may create some contours for what exactly a "compelling governmental interest" is under these circumstances. Politically, the case seems likely to pit "law and order" conservatives against religious conservatives, the latter of which have strongly defended an expansive reading of the RFRA. This is another case that could easily go either way, but my sense is that the Tenth Circuit will be reversed. I do think, however, that if it does go this way the opinion will be fairly narrow and will stress the "compelling governmental interest" line in a way that makes the holding much more fact-specific.
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz (6th Cir.) [Topic: Sovereign Immunity/Bankruptcy]
Question Presented:
"May Congress use the Article I Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity?"
Background and Majority Opinion: [per curiam decision]
Wallace Bookstores, Inc. operated several college bookstores in a number of states including Virginia, where the Central Virginia Community College and three other state colleges did business with them. Wallace declared bankruptcy, however, and the liquidating supervisor of the company (Katz) filed a lawsuit in a Kentucky bankruptcy court claiming that the colleges owed Wallace Bookstores money. The colleges objected, arguing that Wallace could not sue the schools on the basis of state sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court denied this motion on the basis of a Sixth Circuit case called Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, which held that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution allows Congress to use its bankruptcy powers to repeal state sovereign immunity.
The colleges eventually appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which summarily affirmed in a per curiam decision. Per curiam decisions are unsigned and (the last case notwithstanding) typically issued when there is little debate amongst the majority about the correct holding, and it doesn't require any extended commentary. That was the case here, as the majority simply stated that they were bound by previous precedent and the both parties' acceptance that Hood applied here.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
The Sixth Circuit's Hood decision appears to stand alone in holding that the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to repeal state sovereign immunity (I may be wrong about the Sixth Cricuit being the only one to hold this, but it is definitely in the minority amongst jurisdictions here). This case raises an issue that the Court declined to address last term, and one that is of potentially great importance to the body of bankruptcy law. Ultimately, however, it appears very likely that the Sixth Circuit will be reversed here, and the bankruptcy ball will be moved very little from the current law.