Welcome to the first Supreme Court Preview!
Over the past few weeks, I've been doing a Supreme Court Roundup summarizing the decisions and their impact for the Court cases handed down that week. Now that the Court is out of session, my plan is to preview 3 or 4 of the cases the Court has agreed to hear for next term, along with a statement as to the potential impact of the case and my prediction of what the Court will do (with the cover-my-butt caveat that my prediction has limited value particularly since briefs haven't even been completed for most of these cases, oral argument is still months away, and we don't know who O'Connor's replacement will be).
For lack of a better method, I'll preview the cases in the order the Court granted certiorari, starting with the first batch of cases granted back on February 22nd. By the start of the next session, I should have all of the currently 41 granted cases covered, hopefully to serve as a helpful resource for the dKos community. With that said, here we go...
IBP v. Alvarez (9th Cir.) and
Tum v. Barber Foods (1st Cir.) (consolidated cases). [Topic: Worker's Compensation/Statutory Construction]
Questions Presented:
"1) Is time employees must spend walking to and from stations where required safety equipment is distributed compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act?
2) Do employees have a right to compensation for time they must spend waiting at required safety equipment distribution stations?"
Background and Majority Opinions: [Tum authored by Judge Juan Torruella, a Reagan appointee; Alvarez authored by Judge Sidney Thomas, a Clinton appointee]
The Fair Standards Labor Act ("FLSA"), among many other things, requires employers to pay employees for all of the time which the employer requires employees to work. In 1947, after adoption of the FSLA, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Act specifically exempts compensation for walking time to and from the "actual place of performance of the principal activities." This Act also exempts from compensation those activities (including waiting time) which occur before or after the employees' "principal activities." However, in the 1956 case of Steiner v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that not all such pre-and post-work activities could go uncompensated - employers must pay for the time involved in activities that are an "integral and indispensable part" of the regular workday and are done for "the benefit of the employer."
Several employees in a meat packing plant (in Alvarez) and a poultry-processing plant (in Tum) sued their respective employers, alleging that they had violated the FLSA because the employers did not compensate the employees for the time they had to walk over to and wait at the places where they picked up required safety equipment. The employees argued that though the Portal-to-Portal Act exempts "walking time", it refers only to that time spent walking before starting work. Since they were required to walk to pick up safety equipment, they already started work even though they didn't punch in yet. Further, they argued that the waiting time for picking up the required equipment is an "integral and indispensable" part of the employees' work, and thus should be compensated under the FLSA (and Steiner).
The 9th Circuit and 1st Circuit came to differing conclusions on this question. The 9th Circuit (in Alvarez) decided in favor of the employees, holding that the walking and waiting both constituted "work" and were "integral and indispensable" to their job. Certainly the walking and waiting was done for the benefit of the employer, since wearing the safety equipment is required under federal law and the employees' doing so allowed the employer to conform to its legal obligations. Thus, the Steiner rule applies to the employees.
The 1st Circuit (in Tum) took the opposite tack and decided in favor of the employers. The court held that Steiner did not apply, because the "integral and indispensable" activities in that case referred only "donning and doffing" safety equipment, not the walking and waiting associated with picking up the equipment. Accepting the employees' argument would result in a too-broad reading of Steiner that goes against Congress' intent in adopting the Portal-to-Portal Act and which could lead to illogical real-world results.
Concurring Opinion (in Tum): [authored by Judge Michael Boudin, a Bush I appointee]
This concurrence helpfully goes a bit more into the history of the Portal-to-Portal Act and the Steiner case, noting the tension existing between both - a tension that would be exacerbated with Steiner's expansion to walking and waiting time.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
The questions presented have a significant practical importance, since in many cases the walking and waiting times for employees add up to a significant amount. However, I think it is unlikely that the Court will expand the pro-employee Steiner decision to this context, given the pro-employer inclinations of the Court and that the plain reading of the actual Portal-to-Portal Act text probably provides the employers with the stronger (though by no means only) argument. Thus, I think the Court will reverse Alvarez and affirm Tum.
Gonzales v. Oregon (9th Cir.) [Topic: Assisted Suicide/Statutory Construction]
Question Presented:
"Whether the Attorney General has permissibly construed the Controlled Substances Act...to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for the purpose of facilitating an individual's suicide, regardless of a state law purporting to authorize such distribution."
Background and Majority Opinion: [authored by Judge Richard Tallman, a Clinton appointee]
The Controlled Substances Act (and its accompanying regulations) allows the Attorney General to revoke a physician's prescription privileges if he determines that the physician "committed such acts as would render his registration...inconsistent with the public interest." The Act lists 5 factors that the AG shall consider in determining such an inconsistency with the public interest, including the physician's compliance with federal, state, and local laws, the recommendation of the state licensing authorities, and any other conduct that may "threaten the public health and safety."
In 1994, Oregon enacted the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal doses of drugs to patients in order to assist their suicide (subject to certain procedures and regulations). Shortly after, several members of Congress (including then-Senator John Ashcroft) urged Attorney General Janet Reno to declare that assisted suicide violated the CSA, which she refused to do. When Ashcroft later became AG, however, he issued a "Ashcroft Directive" proclaiming that the conduct authorized by the Death With Dignity Act was "inconsistent with the public interest", thus giving him the power to revoke the prescription privileges of assisted-suicide providing physicians. A doctor, several ill patients, and Oregon then brought suit against the Attorney General's office, arguing that the Ashcroft Directive was a misinterpretation of the CSA and should be deemed unlawful.
The 9th Circuit agreed, holding that the Ashcroft Directive violated both the plain language of the CSA and Congress' intent in enacting it. According to the court, Congress provided no indication in the CSA that the AG should have the power to regulate assisted suicide; rather, the purpose of the CSA was to regulate the "field of drug abuse." Further, the AG did not consider all 5 factors that he was required to consider before deeming a practice "inconsistent with the public interest" - in fact, he failed to consider at least 3 of the factors. The court also stressed that a commitment to federalism requires that state governments bear the primary responsibility for physician assisted suicide - a principle the Ashcroft Directive ignores.
Dissenting Opinion: [authored by Judge J. Clifford Wallace, a Nixon appointee]
The long dissent penned by Judge Wallace argued that Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA is entitled deference for a number of reasons. First, there is no textual support for the majority's view that the "field of drug abuse" that the CSA was intended to cover does not also cover prescribing drugs for the purpose of assisting suicides. Rather, the Act targets all "improper use of controlled substances", not clarifying what "improper" in this context means. Second, the majority's reliance on legislative history (and Congress' intent) is not warranted, since such an examination is a "speculative enterprise" (and even if it was acceptable, there is legislative history to support the Ashcroft). Third, Ashcroft did not sidestep the 5 factor inquiry required in the CSA. Fourth, contrary to the majority's holding, state governments bear primary responsibility for assisted suicide only in the absence of federal law - and the AG's interpretation is federal law.
There's quite a bit to Wallace's dissent, but the main idea is that there is nothing in the text of the CSA to suggest that the court should refuse to give deference to the Ashcroft Directive here.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
If Ashcroft (now Gonzales) prevails, the Oregon Death With Dignity Act will be rendered largely meaningless. The Attorney General could (and presumably would) revoke the prescription privileges of doctors engaging in physician assisted suicide. So, this case is another big battle in the assisted suicide war.
With that said, I consider it quite likely that the 9th Circuit will be reversed. Judge Wallace's dissent is very Scalia-like (except for the minor reliance on legislative history), and in fact I wouldn't be surprised if Scalia does write the majority opinion with liberal borrowing from Wallace's dissent. This is one case where O'Connor's replacement very well could make the difference in another 5-4 decision.
Schaffer v. Weast (4th Cir.) [Topic: Statutory Construction]
Question Presented:
"Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, when parents of a disabled child and a local school district reach an impasse over the child's individualized education program, either side has a right to bring the dispute to an administrative hearing officer for resolution. At the hearing, which side has the burden of proof - the parents or the school district?"
Background and Majority Opinion: [authored by Judge Blane Michael, a Clinton appointee]
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") gives children with certain disabilities (learning disabilities, etc.) the right to a "free appropriate public education" tailored to meet his or her unique needs through the use of an "Individualized Education Program" ("IEP"). School systems develop IEPs, but if a child's parents are not satisfied with the IEP, they can start an administrative proceeding to challenge it. The IDEA, however, is completely silent on which party (the parents or the schools) have the burden of proof in this hearing. This is a big deal, because having the burden of proof makes it considerably more difficult to prevail.
In this case, the parents of a disabled child (Brian Schaffer) had started an administrative hearing to challenge his IEP. At the hearing, the judge assigned the burden of proof on the parents, but the District Court reversed, assigning the burden to the school system. At the subsequent hearing, the judge found in favor of the parents, and the school system appealed.
The 4th Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the burden of proof should be placed on the parents. The court began from the premise that when a statute is silent regarding the burden of proof, the burden is usually placed upon the party initiating the proceeding. The majority then rejected the parents' argument that the school system should have the burden because the schools have the obligation to provide "free appropriate public education", analogizing to other statutes (such as the Civil Rights Act) that assign the burden of proof to the plaintiff bringing the suit. The majority also rejected the argument that the schools should have the burden since they have much more expertise about IEPs than do parents (and thus are better equipped to overcome their burden), in part because parents do have a great deal of information about their child's situation by the time the IEP is finally developed. Thus, the majority saw no reason to depart from the general presumption that plaintiffs should bear the burden of proof.
Dissenting Opinion: [authored by Judge Michael Luttig, a Bush I appointee]
Judge Luttig argued in dissent that the school district is actually in a far better position than parents to demonstrate that it has met its affirmative IEP obligation, and thus is the proper party to have the burden of proof. He criticized the majority for making too much of the "rule" that the burden is usually place upon the plaintiff, stating further that factors of "policy, convenience, and fairness" can and do weigh against placing the burden on the parents in this case.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
This case was taken because of a deep split of circuits courts on this question. As mentioned earlier, the resolution of this question is important in the IEP/special education context, since often (as in this case) the placement of the burden of proof can determine the outcome. Though this question could easily go either way, I would lean towards the 4th Circuit decision being upheld, mainly because general presumptions such as the "plaintiff's burden" rule tend to carry more credence than "policy, convenience, and fairness" with this Court. We shall see.