Is it that time already? Yep -- time for another SCOTUS preview. The Court granted only three cases this past March, so all three are previewed here.
This time we have a dealth penalty case that probably will garner a bit of media attention and popular interest, and two cases of stuatory interpretation that probably won't. But, hey, I cover 'em all.
So away we go...
Brown v. Sanders (
9th Cir.) [Topic: Death Penalty]
Questions Presented:
"1. Is the California death penalty statute, which allows a jury in the penalty phase to consider a single list of eleven "open-ended" factors, not labeled as aggravating or mitigating, a "weighing statute" for which the state court is required to determine that the presence of an invalid special circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the jury's determination of penalty?
2. If an affirmative answer to the first question was dictated by precedent, was it necessary for the state supreme court to specifically use the phrases "harmless error" or "reasonable doubt" in determining that there was no "reasonable possibility" that the invalid special circumstance affected the jury's sentence selection?"
Background and Majority Opinion: [authored by Judge Raymond Fisher, a Clinton appointee]
This case concerns yet another piece of the Supreme Court's increasingly complex death penalty jurisprudence. In a typical death penalty case, the prosecution will introduce aggravating factors to justify imposition of the death penalty, and the defense will introduce mitigating factors. If the jury subsequently imposes a death penalty based upon some or all of the aggravating factors, but an appellate court later holds some or all of these factors legally invalid, what happens to the death sentence? On this point, the Court has defined several procedural rules to be followed by lower courts when a lower appellate court invalidates aggravating factor(s). The rules differ depending on whether the relevant state, in regards to the particular death penalty system, is a "weighing" or "non-weighing" state. A state with a "weighing" death penalty system requires that the jury weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors before imposing death, such that the later invalidation of an aggravating factor casts "serious doubt" on the validity of the sentence. Those with a "non-weighing" system allow juries to impose death on the basis of any one factor without weighing mitigating circumstances - and in these, elimination of just one of many aggravating factors does not invalidate the sentence.
Ronald Sanders was convicted for murdering a woman in California as part of a drug dispute and armed robbery. The prosecution sought the death penalty, and the jury imposed it. The jury found several aggravating circumstances to be relevant - that the murder happened during a robbery and burglary; that the woman was killed to prevent her testimony; and the murder was "heinous, atrocious, and cruel. On appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated both the burglary and "heinous murder" circumstances on legal grounds, but nevertheless upheld the sentence. Sanders filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which was denied. The Ninth Circuit then granted Sanders' appeal, and reversed the death sentence.
In reversing Sanders' death sentence, the majority first concluded that California's death penalty system is a "weighing system". (California's death penalty statute lists 11 possible aggravating factors that juries may consider, and specifies that the jury shall impose death if "the mitigating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.") Though the system is a bit different than other "weighing" states, it is nonetheless "clear" that California is governed by a weighing system, since the jury may place different weight on any of a statutorily limited list of factors. The court then noted that it had "substantial uncertainty" that the California Supreme Court had concluded (as required in these circumstances) that the invalidated factors were "harmless error" beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the lower court had not even used the words "harmless error" or "reasonable doubt" in its analysis of the role the invalidated factors played in the jury's determination. The court then applied its own "harmless error" analysis to overturn the death sentence, holding that the invalidation of the two aggravating factors was not simply "harmless" to Sanders.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
The death penalty issues in Sanders are not as large as in previous Supreme Court cases (i.e. prohibiting execution of minors or mentally retarded individuals). Rather, it is one of an ever-continuing torrent of "minor" capital punishment cases that attempt to delineate the contours of death penalty acceptability. With that said, my guess is that the Supreme Court will affirm the Ninth Circuit (perhaps surprisingly, since it doesn't happen often). I think the Court will defer to the Ninth Circuit's application of its precedent interpreting the California death penalty statutes (as making California a "weighing" state). Nevertheless, the Court will not likely answer Question #2 in the affirmative - I doubt it will formalistically require appellate court use of particular phrases in its written opinions.
As a side note, it is important to note that death penalty jurisprudence continues to get murkier, with myriad exceptions and exceptions to exceptions. This strengthens the argument, in my mind, that the death penalty is ultimately unsustainable because its application lacks any real theoretical (or even practical) foundation, thus inviting abuse, favoritism, and discrimination. This case doesn't explicitly touch upon this issue, but I think it's important to note whenever considering death penalty law, as the Court will do here.
Volvo Trucks North America v. Reeder-Simco (8th Cir.) [Topic: Statutory Construction/Business Competition]
Questions Presented:
"1. Whether an unaccepted offer that does not lead to a purchase - so that there
is not `discrimination between different purchasers' as the statutory
language contemplates - may be the basis for liability under the Robinson-Patman Act.
2. Whether the Act permits recovery of damages by a disfavored purchaser that
does lose sales or profits to a competitor that does not purchase from the
defendant, but does not lose sales or profits to any purchaser that `receives
the benefit of' the defendant's price discrimination."
Background and Majority Opinion: [authored by Judge Kermit Bye, a Clinton appointee]
This case concerns an interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act ("RPA"), which prohibits persons engaged in commerce "to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities" such that a monopoly or other roadblock to business competition would result. Note that one must be a "purchaser" to recover under the RPA.
Reeder-Simco, Inc. was a Volvo dealer in Arkansas. The typical way Reeder obtained trucks was to first initiate a competitive bidding process with a retail customer and then negotiate with Volvo to get a below-wholesale price (so that it could turn a profit). This case arose, in short, from Reeder's claim that Volvo gave other dealers better below-wholesale prices than to Reeder, in part in an alleged effort to eliminate Reeder.
After a full trial, the jury found against Volvo. Both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit denied Volvo's attempts to overturn the jury verdict, holding that Volvo can be (and because of the jury verdict, is) liable under the RPA. In short, the Eighth Circuit majority held that Reeder was a "purchaser" (and thus able to sue under the RPA) because of four instances of Volvo's "preferential treatment" to other dealers, despite the fact that Reeder provided scant direct evidence of how those dealers profited at Reeder's expense. Further, Reeder has a claim for all damages suffered as a result of Volvo's price discrimination, even for alleged damages resulting from Reeder's unfulfilled offers to retail customers not actually leading to purchases.
Dissenting Opinion: [authored by Judge David Hansen, a Reagan appointee]
Judge Hansen dissented from this core part of the majority's opinion, arguing that Reeder's attempt to prove "actual competition" between it and other "favored" dealers was tenuous and irrelevant. Reeder had not, he argued, given actual proof of competition between the dealers themselves.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
Another statutory construction case with relatively little impact outside of specific antitrust/unlawful competition fact patterns that come up from time to time. Like the next previewed case, this case will likely be reversed. In my admittedly quite limited experience with the RPA, it appears to me that the actual text of the statute offers Volvo more of an argument. I see little likelihood (or necessity) for the Court to look beyond the text here.
United States v. Olson (9th Cir.) [Topic: Statutory Construction/Sovereign Immunity]
Questions Presented:
"Whether the liability of the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
with respect to safety inspections is the same as that of private individuals
under like circumstances or, as the Ninth Circuit held, the same as that of
state and municipal entities under like circumstances."
Background and Majority Opinion: [per curiam decision]
Joseph Olson was a coal miner who was disabled when a earthen slab fell on him while working in a mine. He (and another injured worker) sued the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (thus, for legal purposes, suing the United States), claiming that it was negligent in failing to adequately inspect the mine. The plaintiffs had the ability to sue the US via the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), which waives the US' general immunity from private civil lawsuits ("sovereign immunity") for federal employees when negligent acts were committed. However, this waiver can only happen when the governmental negligence happened as part of the government mandatory duties, not when it was performing a discretionary task. The US claimed that this so-called "discretionary-function exception" to the FTCA applied here, thereby exempting it from liability. The District Court agreed with the US, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The majority held that the government's acts were not "discretionary", and thus the exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit did not stop there, however - and what follows is the basis of the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit noted that the text of the FTCA allows liability to attach to the government in the same manner and extent "as a private individual under like circumstances." Nevertheless, the majority held that because mine-inspections are never done by private individuals, the question should be whether "state and municipal entities would be liable" under like circumstances. The majority answered this in the affirmative, and reversed the District Court.
Potential Impact/Prediction:
Pretty ho-hum case of statutory construction we have here. I have little doubt that the Ninth Circuit will be reversed here. The text of the statute is clear, and the Ninth Circuit offers little legal explanation for why a different interpretation of the plain text should be adopted.