Mayle v. Felix (7-2; Souter dissenting)
[Topic: Rights of the Accused]
Background and Opinion:
Jacoby Lee Felix was convicted of murder in California and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal and before the one-year statute of limitations was up (under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act), Felix filed a habeas petition challenging, based upon the Confrontation Clause, the admission of the prosecution's videotaped witness testimony. However, it was only after the one-year limitations period that Felix also objected to the admission of certain pretrial statements he had made, this based upon the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that this latter habeas petition was not time-barred because (in essence) it was just an amendment to his timely filed habeas petition, which both arose out of the same "transaction or occurrence". The Ninth Circuit below ruled that the Fifth Amendment claim was not time barred based upon a broad reading of "transaction or occurrence", and the government appealed.
The Supreme Court (Ginsburg writing) reversed, holding that the claim was time-barred. After analyzing the statute of limitations provision of the antiterrorism act, the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment claim asserted a new ground for relief and was supported by facts differing from the Confrontation Clause argument in both time and type. (In other words, Felix's Confrontation Clause argument was based upon another witness' testimony, while the Fifth Amendment claim was based upon his own). The Court further noted concern that the Ninth's Circuit's broader interpretation of "transaction or occurrence" would make nearly every late-filed habeas petition "relate back" to the original timely petition - an interpretation, the Court noted, that was not supported by the majority of federal courts.
Other Opinions:
Justice Souter filed a dissent (joined by Stevens), stressing that Felix's two claims were clearly related, because both occurred during the court process resulting in his conviction (the broad view the Ninth Circuit had adopted). Souter futher argued that the Court's distinction between the two claims as different in "time or type" is not a necessary interpretation, and in fact the Court's narrow reading of the time limitations clause creates unfairness for poor habeas petitioners vis-à-vis those able to afford counsel. This is because, as a practical matter, paid counsel are more likely to file all the claims from the start, whereas a defendant without counsel is unlikely to have the requisite knowledge to follow the appropriate procedural requirements.
Impact:
This case, while somewhat limited, is still quite important - my impression is that this situation, where a criminal defendant amends a timely-filed habeas petition after the applicable time limitation runs out, occurs fairly often. I agree with the dissent's assessment on this one - there is no question that pro se defendants (i.e. those without counsel) will be harmed the most. Many (probably most) pro se habeas petitions are frivolous, but this is a loss for those criminal defendants with a decent legal case but without the legal assistance that wealthier defendants have available.
American Trucking Assoc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Commiss'n (9-0; Thomas and Scalia concurring)
[Topic: Commerce Clause]
Background and Opinion:
Michigan imposes a $100 annual fee that is imposed on all trucks engaging in intrastate (solely in-state) commercial trucking. A trucking association brought a constitutional challenge to the fee, claiming that the fee violated the so-called "dormant Commerce Clause", which prohibits states from enacting basically protectionist measures that act to help in-state industries at the expense of interstate commerce generally. This is because, the association claimed, those trucks doing interstate and intrastate commerce does less business than those operating solely in-state, and are thus charged more per-mile than their solely in-state comrades.
The Court, Breyer writing for the majority, rejected this argument. Michigan's fee does not, on its face, discriminate against out-of-state enterprises since it applies only to intrastate commerce. Further, it is a flat regulatory fee that applies equally to in- and out-of-state trucks. Requiring Michigan to only regulate per-mile (as the trucking association argued would be the most fair and constitutionally permissible) would create a number of burdens that the state may well have considered and rejected, not to mention a per-truck fee system may be more logical than a per-mile system in any case.
Also, this situation is distinguishable from the Court's previous invalidation of a flat fee in Pennsylvania that placed an "axle fee" on all trucks entering the state, even on those not doing any business in the state. Unlike that unconstitutional fee, the Michigan levy does not tax entrance into the state nor does it try to tax interstate commerce.
Other Opinions:
Scalia concurred in the judgment, but issued his own reasoning apart from the majority's use of (what he termed) the Court's "ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions." He would simply look at whether the fee facially discriminated against out-of-staters (it did not) and have the analysis end there.
Thomas also filed a concurrence, arguing that the entire enterprise of striking down state statutes based upon the dormant Commerce Clause is suspect (an opinion not exactly in the mainstream of modern Constitutional practice, but take it as it is).
Impact:
American Trucking clarifies the limit of the dormant Commerce Clause when it comes to states imposing flat fees on commerce, but this decision was no surprise. The deference to the states to impose certain regulations on commerce inside their borders remains unchanged.
San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco (9-0; Rehnquist concurring)
[Topic: Takings/Full Faith and Credit]
Background and Opinion:
In 1996, a San Francisco ordinance required the San Remo Hotel to pay over $500,000 as part of a "conversion fee." The hotel, not amused, filed suit in state court, claiming that this fee was a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. After failing in state court, the hotel filed nearly identical claims in federal court. The problem, however, is that the current Full Faith and Credit statute prohibits the same issues from being litigated from scratch in different courts when judgments in those other courts have already been finalized.
Nevertheless, San Remo argued that there was a problem with this as applied to takings claims. Based on the 1985 Supreme Court decision of Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, takings claimants cannot file suit in federal court until the state has officially denied them just compensation (thus, in many cases, forcing takings claimants to first go to state court). However, if the state officially denies just compensation but in doing so also rejects the federal takings claims, the operation of the Full Faith and Credit statute effectively denies them a federal forum for their takings claims. Because of the particular requirements placed on takings claimants to go to state court in the first place, the hotel argued that an exception to Full Faith and credit was needed in takings cases.
The Court rejected this argument. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected the contention that takings claimants simply have a constitutional right to have their claims litigated in federal court. To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly held that, in other situations, state-law decisions may well prevent litigants from pressing their claims yet again in federal court. Further, if Congress intended to provide such an exception to takings litigants, it could simply write it into the statute without the Court reading such an exception into it. If the situation the hotel describes in unfair, Congress, and not the Court, is the appropriate avenue to bring the concern.
Other Opinions:
The Chief Justice (along with O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas) wrote a separate opinion expressing his judgment that the Williamson County decision mentioned above was wrongly decided. With that important caveat, he fully joined the unanimous consensus that San Remo Hotel's takings claims were precluded by the Full Faith and Credit statute.
Impact:
No lasting importance here, since the Court simply refused to create an exception to Full Faith and Credit requirements. Another loss for takings claimants, to go along with Kelo (the takings for "economic development" case decided along with San Remo).
Rompila v. Beard (5-4; Kennedy dissenting)
[Topic: Sixth Amendment/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel]
Background and Opinion:
Ronald Rompila was convicted (among other things) of a gruesome murder in Pennsylvania. During the trial, the prosecution had offered evidence of aggravating factors justifying imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, Rompila's defense attorney offered only brief mitigation evidence that, based upon the jury's eventual imposition of a death sentence, was not particularly convincing.
After being sentenced to death, Rompila's new attorneys asserted a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stating that there was ample additional mitigation evidence available (including Rompila's alcoholism, tough childhood, etc.) that the trial counsel did not put forth. This claim was based upon the standard set in the 1984 case of Strickland v. Washington, which defines ineffective assistance as unreasonable performance resulting in prejudice to the defendant.
The majority, Justice Souter writing, agreed. The majority examined several avenues Rompila's trial counsel could have taken to find the additional mitigation evidence, including an examination of Rompila's prior conviction files. That the trial counsel did not even look at these files when he knew that the state would use the former convictions as aggravating evidence in seeking the death penalty was, according to the Court, objectively "unreasonable." The Court would not expect an appointed criminal defense attorney to scour the globe looking for evidence, but given the easy access to and clear importance of these files to this case, the trial counsel by any reasonable standard should have examined the files. Because the Court also concluded that these ineffective assistance resulted in prejudice to Rompila, the Court reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial.
Other Opinions:
Soon-to-be-former Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence intending to make clear, contrary to the dissent's claim, that the majority opinion does not place a "rigid requirement" on criminal defense attorneys to read every page of a prior conviction file to meet the Strickland standard.
Kennedy (along with Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist) dissented. According to the dissent, the Court's decision had no place in previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and placed too much of a burden on already limited appointed criminal defense attorneys. The dissent focused on the fact that the prior conviction files in question were old and extensive, and that the decision to pass on reviewing them was a reasonable trial decision. Kennedy added that even if the assistance was "ineffective", this in itself did not cause prejudice to Rompila. Thus, the dissent would have upheld the conviction.
Impact:
This is a pretty significant decision, because it broadens the Strickland Sixth Amendment protections criminal defendants enjoy when ineffective assistance of counsel is present. Given the importance of receiving a quality defense if charged with a capital crime, this is no small matter. Also important to note is that, like in this case, it was often O'Connor's vote creating a 5-4 majority in cases broadening or maintaining the rights of criminal defendants. It should be interesting to see how this will change with O'Connor's impending retirement.
